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NOTES
The Assured Clear Distance Ahead
Rule in Ohio
IN OHIO, when an automobile collides with an obstruction on the
highway it becomes important to determine whether the driver was ex-
ceeding a speed which would have permitted him to stop within his as-
sured clear distance ahead.' This issue must be determined since Section
4511 of the Ohio Revised Code (Ohio General Code Section 6307-21)
provides:
no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon any street or high-
way at a greater speed than will permit him to stop within the assured
dear distance ahead.2
Prior to the passage of Section 6307-21, in order to avoid liability for
negligence, a motorist who was involved in a collision was only required
'Erdman v. Mestrovich, 155 Ohio St. 85, 97 N.E.2d 674 (1951); Smiley v. Spring
Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3 (1941); State v. Cheatwood, 84 Ohio App.
125, 82 N.E.2d 770 (1948). These courts have held that the assured clear distance
ahead is measured by the shorter of the two following distances: (1) the distance
between the operator's vehicle and the limit of his vision ahead, or (2) the distance
between his vehicle and any intermediate discernible object which constitutes an
obstruction in his path or lane of travel.
'OHIO REv. CODE § 4511.21 (OHIO GEN. CODE § 6307-21.) This statute not
only sets out the assured dear distance ahead rule but also states the general speed
limit in Ohio which is a speed that is reasonable and proper in view of the condi-
tions prevalent upon the highway.
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to prove that he had conformed to the standard of ordinary care.3 The
Ohio courts have held since the passage of the statute that it sets forth a
legal standard of care in addition to the common law standard4 and that
a violation of the statute which proximately results in injury constitutes
negligence per se.'
An analysis of the cases shows that the mere occurrence of a collision
does not necessarily indicate a violation of the statute, but when the sur-
rounding circumstances are taken into account a collision may constitute
evidence of a violation.6 Therefore, the issue of whether a collision proves
that the driver violated the statute may present a question of fact for the
jury. Where reasonable minds cannot differ on an issue of fact, however,
the court must decide the issue as a matter of law.7 In many cases, the
manner in which the accident occurred has been held to be conclusive
evidence that the driver violated the assured clear distance ahead rule, and
in such cases negligence has been found as a matter of law." Thus, when-
ever a driver has collided with a readily discernible object located ahead
of him and within his lane of travel for a substantial period of time, he
has been held, as a matter of law, to have been negligent." Under such
circumstances, the courts have indicated that the fact that a collision oc-
curred furnishes evidence from which reasonable minds could only con-
dude that the driver was traveling at such a speed that he was unable to
stop within the assured clear distance ahead.
While the majority of the reported cases involving the assured dear
distance ahead rule have come within the above-mentioned situation, there
each case must be considered in the light of its facts and circumstances, and the
usual tests applied to determine whether there was a failure to exercise ordinary care
in the operation of such motor vehicle." Tresise v. Ashdown, 118 Ohio St. 307, 313,
160 N.E. 898, 899 (1928)
'Skinner v. Pennsylvania R.R., 127 Ohio St. 69, 186 N.E. 722 (1933).
'Smiley v. Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3 (1941); Gumley, Adm'r
v. Cowman, 129 Ohio St. 36, 193 N.E. 627 (1934); Skinner v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
127 Ohio St. 69, 186 N.E. 722 (1933)
'McFadden v. Transp. Co., 156 Ohio St. 430, 103 N.E.2d 385 (1952); Smiley v.
Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2a 3 (1941); Kormos v. Cleveland Retail
Credit Mens Co., 131 Ohio St. 471, 3 N.E.2d 427 (1936); Gumley, Adm'r v. Cow--
man, 129 Ohio St. 69, 186 N.E. 722 (1933).
" Ziebro v. Cleveland, 157 Ohio St. 489, 106 N.E.2d 161 (1952); cf. Hamden Lodge
v. Gas Co., 127 Ohio St. 469, 189 N.E. 246 (1934)
'Accord, McFadden v. Transp. Co., 156 Ohio St. 430, 103 N.E.2d 385 (1952).
'Kormos v. Cleveland Retail Credit Men s Co., 131 Ohio St. 471, 3 N.E.2d 427
(1936); Higbee Co. v. Lindeman, 131 Ohio St. 479, 3 N.E.2d 426 (1936); Gumley,
Adm r v. Cowman, 129 Ohio St. 36, 193 N.E. 627 (1934); Skinner v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 127 Ohio St. 69, 186 N.E. 722 (1933); Kern v. Contract Cartage Co., 55
Ohio App. 481, 9 N.E.2d 869 (1936); Transp. Car Forwarding Co. v. Sladden, 49
Ohio App. 53, 195 N.E. 256 (1934); accord, McFadden v. Transp. Co., 156 Ohio
St. 430, 103 N.E.2d 385 (1952)
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have been cases where the manner in which the collision occurred consti-
tuted evidence of a violation which presented a factual issue for the jury.
For example, in Pressing v,. Roadway Express, Inc.'0 the defendant
drove out of a gas station into the plaintiff's path on the highway. The
plaintiff failed to stop and a collision occurred. Conflicting evidence
was presented as to the distance between the plaintiff and the defendant
when the defendant's vehicle first appeared in the road. The trial court
directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground of contributory negli-
gence per se, based on a violation of the assured clear distance ahead rule.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court and held that if the as-
sured clear distance ahead is suddenly cut down without the driver's fault
there is no violation of the statute unless in the exercise of ordinary care
the driver could have stopped and avoided the colision; 1 and, since rea-
sonable minds could have differed whether the plaintiff could have
stopped in the exercise of ordinary care, the question of whether he vio-
lated the assured clear distance ahead rule should have been left to the
jury. 12
Under some circumstances, a collision on the highway does not involve
the assured dear distance ahead rule. Thus, it has been held that the
rule has no application when- all that is shown is a collision between
motor vehicles which converged at a crossroad. 3 The crossroads collision
is an instance of an objects entering the driver's path at a distance so
much shorter than his assured clear distance aheadI4 that regardless of
whether the driver violated the assured clear distance ahead rule, he could
not have stopped in time to avoid the collision. Therefore, the issue
whether the driver was negligent cannot be decided on the basis of the
assured clear distance ahead rule.'5
Since in every collision, even though it be the moment before impact,
the driver is at some tune exceeding a speed that will permit him to stop
" 69 Ohio App. 1, 42 N.E.2d 720 (1942).
' Erdman v. Mestrovich, 155 Ohio St. 85, 97 N.E.2d 674 (1951); accord, McFadden
v. Transp. Co., 156 Ohio St. 430, 103 N.E.2d 385 (1952); Kelver v. Express Co.,
151 Ohio St 467, 86 N.E.2d 608 (1949); Smiley v. Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St.
81, 33 N.E.2d 3 (1941)
'Accord, Hamden Lodge v. Gas Co., 127 Ohio St. 469, 189 N.E. 246 (1934);
Thomin v. Norwood S.&D. Mfg. Co., 74 Ohio App. 505, 59 N.E.2d 605 (1944).
'Sherer v. Smith, 155 Ohio St. 567, 99 N.E.2d 763 (1951); Blackford v. Kaplan,
135 Ohio St. 268, 20 N.E.2d 522 (1939); Wade, Adm'x v. Schneider, 63 Ohio
App. 24, 25 N.E.2d 290 (1939).
' The courts have stated that the assured clear distance ahead is limited to the driver's
lane of travel. McFadden v. Transp. Co., 156 Ohio St. 430, 103 N.E.2d 385 (1952);
Erdman v. Mestrovich, 155 Ohio St. 85, 97 N.E.2d 674 (1951). Therefore, in a
collision at a crossroad the assured clear distance ahead for both parties normally
extends beyond the point where the collision occurs.
" When a collision occurs with an object which enters the driver s path at a distance
ahead shorter than tue assured clear distance ahead, the driver does not violate the
1953]
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within the assured dear distance ahead, a literal application of the statute
would require a holding that every motorist who collided with an obstruc-
tion on the highway is negligent. Obviously the legislature never in-
tended to create such a harsh rule. Apparently recogmzing this fact, the
Ohio courts have made several attempts to construe the assured dear
distance ahead rule so as to set forth a reasonable test to determine when
a party to a collision is negligent per se.16
Although earlier cases had stated that there might be situations in
which a driver who collided with an obstruction on the highway did not
violate the assured clear distance ahead rule, 7 Kormos v. Cleveland Retail
Credit Men's Co.'8 was the first supreme court case to make an affirma-
tive statement indicating what those situations might be. By way of
dictum the Supreme Court of Ohio stated in the Kormos case:
An operator who has failed to comply with the "assured dear distance
statute" may excuse such failure and avoid the legal imputation of negli-
gence per se by establishing that, without his fault, and because of cir-
cumstances over which he had no control, compliance with the law was
rendered impossible."
The view expressed in the Kormos case was applied shortly thereafter
in Matz v. Curs Cartage Co. 20 and Hangen v. Hadfield.21 In each of
these cases, the collision was caused by an oncoming automobile within
the plaintiff's lane of travel. The holdings were that a motorist suddenly
faced with an oncoming automobile wrongfully within his lane of travel
a short distance ahead is confronted with such an emergency as to "ex-
cuse"22 his failure to comply with the assured dear distance ahead rule.
assured clear distance ahead rule unless in the exercise of ordinary care he could have
stopped and avoided the collision. McFadden v. Transp. Co., 156 Ohio St. 430, 103
N.E.2d 385 (1952); Bickel v. American Can Co., 154 Ohio St. 380, 96 N.E.2d 4
(1950); Smiley v. Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3 (1941) In the
crossroad cases the entrance of the object with which collision occurs is almost in-
stantaneous with the collision so that even if the driver were exercising ordinary care
he could not stop and avoid the collision. But query- If a driver at a substantial dis-
tance away from a crossroad becomes aware that another vehicle is certain to enter his
path, should he not, in the exercise of ordinary care, be able to stop regardless of how
short a distance ahead such vehicle first enters his path? This questibn has apparently
never been raised so the point is moot.
"Bickel v. American Can Co., 154 Ohio St. 380, 96 N.E.2d 4 (1950); Smiley v.
Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3 (1941), Gumley, Adm'r v. Cowman,
129 Ohio St. 36, 193 N.E. 627 (1934); see McFadden v. Elmer C. Breuer Transp.
Co., 98 N.E.2d 339, 345 (Ohio App. 1951) (dissenting opinion).
"See Gumley, Admr v. Cowman, 129 Ohio St. 36, 39, 193 N.E. 627, 629 (1934)
"131 Ohio St. 471, 3 N.E.2d 427 (1936)
"Id. at 472, 3 N.E.2d at 427
o 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N.E.2d 220 (1937).
" 135 Ohio St. 281, 20 N.E.2d 715 (1939)
"Although the Ohio courts have discussed the possibility of a "legal excuse" for neg-
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In Smiley v. Spring Bed Co. 23 the defendant's truck was parked with-
out lights on the right side of the highway just beyond the summit of a
hill. The plaintiff's automobile came over the top of the hill where the
plaintiff was momentarily blinded by the headlights of an oncoming auto-
mobile and collided with the defendant's truck. The jury found for the
plaintiff and the court rendered judgment accordingly.
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the judgment and held that the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The fact that
the plaintiff was blinded by oncoming headlights did not "excuse '2' his
violation of the statute."5 The court stated that if a motorist's view "is
cut off by darkness, by a curve in the highway, or by the crest of a hill,
the distance between him and the point where his vision ends is the as-
sured dear distance ahead."26  Therefore, the fact that the plaintiff did
not see the defendant's truck until he came over the top of the hill was
no defense on the issue of whether the plaintiff had violated the assured
dear distance ahead rule." The court further stated by way of dictum:
the driver of a motor vehide must not operate it at a greater speed than
will permit him to bring it to a stop within the distance between his motor
vehicle and a discernible object obstructing his path or line of travel, un-
less such assured clear distance ahead is suddenly cut down or lessened
without his fault, by the entrance within such assured dear distance ahead
and into his path or line of travel of some obstruction which renders him
unable, in the exercise of ordinary care, to avoid colliding therewith.'
Although the Smiley and Kormos cases together laid down a fairly
definite test to determine whether there was a violation of the assured
dear distance ahead rule, the supreme court left unanswered the question
of whether the party alleging a violation satisfied his burden of proof
merely by showing that a collision had occurred. The Smiley test was
ligence even though the assured clear distance ahead rule was violated, the facts which
give rise to the "legal excuse" recognized by these cases actually tend to prove that
there was no violation of the assured clear distance ahead rule and not merely that
there was an excuse for violating the rule. E.g., Bickel v. American Can Co., 154 Ohio
St. 380, 96 N.E.2d 4 (1950); Smiley v. Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d
3 (1941); Hangen v. Hadfield, 135 Ohio St. 281, 20 N.E.2d 715 (1939); Matz v.
Curtis Cartage Co., 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N.E.2d 220 (1937); Kormos v. Cleveland
Retail Credit Men's Co., 131 Ohio St. 471, 3 N.E.2d 427 (1936).
=138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3 -(1941).
= See note 23 supra.
'But cf. Curtis v. Hubbel, 42 Ohio App. 520, 182 N.E. 589 (1932) (motorist was
held to have acted reasonably and not to have violated the assured clear distance
ahead rule where he attempted to stop immediately on being blinded by oncoming
headlights). See Note, 133 A.L.R. 967 (1941).
"' Smiley v. Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 84, 33 N.E.2d 3, 5 (1941)
'See Note, 133 A.L.R. 967 (1941).
' Smiley v. Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3 (1941).
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applied in subsequent cases,23 but it was not until McFadden v. Transpor-
tation Co.30 that the Ohio Supreme Court established that the mere fact
that a collision has occurred does not make out a prima facie case of
negligence per se.
The McFadden case involved a collision with a roll of steel, 34 inches
in height and 47 inches in diameter. The defendant admitted that its
negligence was the proximate cause of the steel's falling from one of its
trucks and based its defense solely on an alleged violation of the assured
clear distance ahead rule by the plaintiff's decedent who was killed in the
collision. There was no evidence as to when the steel coil rolled into the
path of the deceased, and there was conflicting evidence as to the distance
ahead at which the steel roll first became discernible to the plaintiff's de-
cedent. The trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, rendered a verdict and
judgment for the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the trial court and said that in
order to prevail the party alleging a violation of the assured clear distance
ahead rule must show that the party charged with negligence:
[collided] with a reasonably discernible object (1) which was located
ahead of him in his lane of travel and which object was (a) static or sta-
tionary, or (b) moving ahead of him in the same direction or (2) which
appeared in his path at a sufficient distance ahead of him to give time, in
the exercise of ordinary care, to bring his automobile to a stop and avoid
a collision."
The defendant in the McFadden case failed to establish that the steel
roll appeared in the deceased's path at a sufficient distance ahead to enable
him to stop in time to avoid a collision and, therefore, did not sustain the
required burden of proof. The court further stated that a finding that
the steel roll was not "reasonably discernible" would have been warranted
by the evidence.
Although the Ohio Supreme Court has consistently implied that there
can be no violation of the assured clear distance ahead rule unless the ob-
ject with which the collision occurred was reasonably discernible,3 2 the
McFadden case is the only decision besides that of Kormos v. Cleveland
Retail Credit Men's Co.33 in which the issue of discernibility was expressly
" Sherer v. Smith, 155 Ohio St. 81, 99 N.E.2d 674 (1951); Erdman v. Mestrovich,
155 Ohio St. 85, 97 N.E.2d 674 (1951); Bickel v. American Can Co., 154 Ohio St.
379, 96 N.E.2d 4 (1950); Klever v. Express Co., 151 Ohio St. 467, 86 N.E.2d 608
(1949); State v. Cheatwood, 84 Ohio App. 125, 82 N.E.2d 770 (1948); Walcott v.
Fuller, 83 Ohio App. 176, 81 N.E.2d 126 (1948); Pressing v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 69 Ohio App. 1, 42 N.E.2d 720 (1942)
'156 Ohio St. 430, 103 N.E.2d 385 (1952)
"Id. at 434, 103 N.E.2d at 387
=Accord, Erdman v. Mestrovich, 155 Ohio St. 85, 97 N.E.2d 674 (1951 ); Smiley v.
Spring Bed Co., 138 Ohio St. 81, 33 N.E.2d 3 (1941); Gumley, Admr v. Cowman,
129 Ohio St. 36, 193 N.E. 627 (1934)
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discussed by the court. In the Kormos case the plaintiff's automobile
struck the defendant's unlighted automobile parked on the highway at
the foot of a hill. In an effort to show that he did not violate the assured
clear distance ahead rule, the plaintiff contended that since the defendant's
vehicle was spattered with mud it was not discernible and that he was
unable to see it until a moment before impact.
The supreme court held that the defendant's automobile was a dis-
cernible object and that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a
matter of law. The court reasoned that an Ohio statute required an auto-
mobile to be equipped with headlights which would reveal any substantial
object for a distance of 200 feet34 and since the automobile with which
the plaintiff collided was a substantial -object it should have been dis-
cernible to him at a distance of 200 feet, whether it was "mud-spattered
or otherwise." The implication of the holding is that so long as an ob-
ject is substantial, it is discernible for purposes of the assured dear dis-
tance ahead rule.35
The reasoning in the Kormos and McFadden cases does not seem to
be in accord.36 The court in the McFadden case took the view that under
certain circumstances an object as large as a roll of steel may not be
reasonably discernible.37 Certainly a roll of steel constitutes a "substantial"
object, so that under the reasoning in the Kormos case it would be a
discernible object.
The determination of discernibility in McFadden -V. Transportation
Co. is based on a more realistic approach than that of the Kormos case.3 s
' 131 Ohio St. 471, 3 N.E.2d 427 (1936).
31OHIO GEN. CODE § 6310-1; repealed, 119 Ohio Laws 766 (1941).
' See Kormos v. Cleveland Retail Credit Men's Co., 131 Ohio St. 471, 478 3 N.E.2d
427, 430 (1936) (dissenting opinion).
" Although the two cases might be distinguishable on the ground that Ohio General
Code Section 6310-1 was repealed prior to the Mcadden case, Ohio Revised Code
Section 4513-15 (Ohio General Code Section 6307-88) is substantially the same as
Section 6310-1 and was applicable in the McFadden case so that the reasoning in
the Kormos case was applicable.
' The court in the McFadden case cited with approval Blowers v. Cedar Falls &
Northern R.R., 233 Iowa 258, 8 N.W.2d 751 (1942) (held, snowplow covered
with snow not discernible as it blended with landscape). See Kormos v. Cleveland
Retail Credit Men's Co., 131 Ohio St. 471,478, 3 N.E.2d 427, 430 (1936) (dissent-
ing opinion).
' Colonial Trust Co. v. Elmer C. Breuer, Inc., 363 Pa. 101, 69 A.2d 126 (1949).
Construing Ohio law, the Pennsylvania court stated: "Assured means what appears
to a reasonably prudent driver, exercising due care, to be the clear distance ahead."
See Kormos v. Cleveland Retail Credit Men's Co., 131 Ohio St. 471, 478, 3 N.E.2d
427, 430 (1936) (dissenting opinion) "To hold a motor vehicle discernible
under any and all circumstances, within the radius of the rays of the headlights,
is to disregard natural conditions."
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